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Abstract
Background: The highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 virus remains a worldwide threat to human and
animal health, while the mechanisms explaining its epizootic emergence and re-emergence in poultry are largely
unknown. Data from Thailand, a country that experienced significant epidemics in poultry and has recorded
suspicious cases of HPAI on a daily basis since 2004, are used here to study the process of emergence. A spatial
approach is employed to describe all HPAI H5N1 virus epizootics from 2004 to 2008 and to characterize the
pattern of emergence: multiple independent introductions of the virus followed by moderate local spread vs. very
rare emergences followed by strong local spread and rare long range diffusion jumps. Sites where epizootics
originate (by foreign introduction, local persistence, or long range jump) were selected from those to which the
disease subsequently spreads using a filter based on relative date and position. The spatial distribution of these
selected foci was statistically analyzed, and to differentiate environmental factors from long range diffusion, we
investigate the relationship of these foci with environmental exposure factors and with rearing characteristics.
Results: During each wave of epizootics, the temporal occurrence of cases did not show a temporal interruption
of more than a week. All foci were globally clustered; i.e., more than 90% of cases had a previous case within a 10
km range and a 21 day period of time, showing a strong local spread. We were able to estimate 60 km as the
maximum distance for the local farm to farm dissemination process. The remaining “emergent” cases have
occurred randomly over Thailand and did not show specific location, clusters, or trends. We found that these foci
are not statistically related to specific environmental conditions or land cover characteristics, and most of them
may be interpreted as long range diffusion jumps due to commercial practices.
Conclusion: We conclude that only a few foci appear to have been at the origin of each HPAI epidemic wave,
leading to the practical action that surveillance and control must focus on farm to farm transmission rather than
on emergence or wild fauna.
1. Background
World-widely spread since 2003, the Highly Pathogenic
Avian Influenza (HPAI) H5N1 virus remains a major
threat to human and animal health, and the mechanisms
of emergence and re-emergence of avian epizootics
remains poorly documented. The respective roles that
are played in the emergence and spread of HPAI by
agricultural and commercial practices, by wild birds, and
by possible persistence of the virus in the environment,
are difficult to quantify. It is an issue of research that
has sparked many debates [1-6].
The association of avian influenza foci (emergent and
dissemination mixed) with environmental factors has
been studied for H7N1 in Italy, for H7N7 in The Neth-
erlands, and for H7N3 in Canada and in Thailand
[7-12]. Spatiotemporal characteristics of HPAI for H5N1
has been studied for Thailand and Vietnam [13,14], but
there have been yet no attempts to investigate the spa-
tiotemporal characteristics of these epizootics that might
distinguish the factors associated with initial disease
cases (index cases) from those associated with onward
pathogen transmission and disease spread or clustering.
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any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.We used a spatiotemporal approach to define and
determine the sites of emergence or reemergence in
Thailand, using a follow up on HPAI reported cases in
poultry by national veterinarian surveillance. In this
paper, “emergence” of the disease in a farm is by defini-
t i o na ni n f e c t i o nt h a td i dn o tc o m ef r o ma n o t h e r
infected farm through a causal relationship in a process
of direct local contamination. The process of emergence
was separated from the dissemination through filtering
procedures that used the date, location, and geographi-
cal arrangement of epizootic cases. We analyzed the
spatial distribution of emergence, and the relationship
between emergence, environmental conditions, and rear-
ing characteristics.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Data collection
T h ed a t au s e di nt h i ss t u d yw e r eb a s e do na l lt h e
reported epizootics of H5N1 avian influenza that
occurred from July 2004 to February 2008 in Thailand,
which experienced significant outbreaks during 2004
and 2005 (figure 1). Our basic study units are infected
farms: cases were recorded at the farm level by the
Department of Livestock Development (DLD, Ministry
of Agriculture and Cooperatives, Thailand), as described
in previous papers [12,15]. This data correspond to the
suspected cases of HPAI detected by the clinical passive
and active monitoring network. The confirmatory
laboratory tests were done on cloacal swabs from live
poultry or from viscera of carcasses, following the proto-
col described by the Office International des Epizooties
[16,17].
In 2007 and 2008, reports on suspected cases were
still active, but since 2006 very few laboratory-confirmed
cases of H5N1 have been reported. If positive but not
declared H5N1 cases were present in Thailand, it fol-
lows that a major proportion of the reported cases
would also be positive. Even if a statement on non-
reported case number seems difficult to make, we can
still estimate the probability P+ o fac a s e( r e p o r t e do r
not) to be positive. This probability can be expressed as
P+ =1-e
1/n log(1-Pn), where Pn is the probability to have
at least one H5N1 positive case among n cases. n is the
sum of reported cases (rc) and non-reported cases (nrc),
and n is unknown, but Pn can be estimated using Prc (i.
e., farmers cannot usually differentiate H5N1 clinical
infection from other infections, such as the Newcastle
disease). In 2007 and 2008, Prc were very low, but rc,
and so n, still large (as the report on cases was still
active). For example, in 2007 the rc was 1,969 and P+
was near 0.
Data were incorporated into a spatial database mana-
ged by a geographic information system (GIS SavGIS).
Because the exact geographical farm locations were
unknown, case coordinates were assigned to the village
they belong, using the village code reported in DLD files.
Thailand has 72,335 villages, according to the National
Statistic Office (NSO) census; every village (in rural or
peri-urban areas) represent an area around a concentra-
tion of houses, but without a delimited boundary; the
geographical location of a village is represented by a
point, representing the geometric center of the group of
houses; the mean of the minimum distance between two
village centers is 1.1 km (median is 0.8 km) with a stan-
dard deviation of 0.8 km. Some analyses were conducted
at the village level, using in each village the number of
infected farms reported in the village. We used also the
next administrative division of Thailand in sub-districts,
for epidemiological mapping, for agricultural census
mapping, and for environmental analysis. Sub-districts
are areas with well defined boundaries; Thailand has
7,410 sub-districts, with a median surface of 50 square
kilometers each, and an average centroïde minimum dis-
tance of 5.6 km (median is 5.2 km).
2.2. Emergence and dissemination
The mechanisms leading to a non-random spatial distri-
bution for an epidemic of an infectious disease are
divided among several factors, which can be roughly
separated into two groups: initial emergence and dissemi-
nation. Initial emergence is a rare phenomenon often
linked to the environment or the organization of space
(e.g., land use, ecological habitat, human activity, and sus-
ceptible organisms), and sometimes linked to other rare
environmental events of natural origin with highly ran-
dom characteristics (e.g., meteorological events). Disse-
mination factors are more related to individual
characteristics (e.g., susceptibility), to proximity among
individuals (i.e., neighborhoods, distances, and vectors of
the disease, if any), and to interactions with the environ-
ment (e.g., ecological, socio-economic, cultural, etc.) [18].
For contagious diseases, selecting emergent cases
allows us to assume statistical independence between
events, which then improves the power of further envir-
onmental correlation analysis. Spatial analysis was car-
ried out to determine if the global spatial distribution of
emergence deviated significantly from randomness (spe-
cific position, clusters, patterns): non-random spatial
distribution of observed cases would highlight explana-
tory factors, while reflecting the non-random spatial dis-
tribution of environmental factors. Statistical tests of
spatial analysis used to verify the global non-random-
ness of spatial distributions are described elsewhere
[19-22]; they are mostly based on inter-event distances
or nearest neighbor distances in point pattern analysis,
or in studying the variability of case counts in subsets of
the study region (quadrant analysis, and spatial and
space time scan statistics). These tests are very
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events have a very low p-value). To prevent the rejection
of the null hypothesis–considering H0 as a situation
which cannot be distinguished from randomness–for
rare events (low p-value) that could induce emergence
but should not be systematically interpreted as related
to a specific location (and need to be still considered as
spatially random), a risk a of 0.1% was used instead of
the classical 5%.
2.3. Framework of Case Emergence : a filter to eliminate
dissemination cases
From our definition of emergence–an infection that
did not come from another infected farm through a
causal relationship in a process of direct contamina-
tion–we might make the assumption that emergent
events are independent, which is not the case for
events in the dissemination process, where the cases
are linked by direct contagion. However, this charac-
terization is difficult to apply globally because it is
impossible to determine whether a case, in the midst
of others, comes from another without investigating
the exact origin of infection. Therefore we adopted a
more restrictive definition in order to filter emergent
cases and to eliminate dissemination cases, based solely
on time and distance, by defining an ‘emergent’ case as
one in which no previous case has been detected dur-
ing a period of T days, in a neighborhood radius of V.
More precisely, we assign around every case f av a r i -
able radius of Vf, depending on the time t:
VV T V T f0 0 () ( ( )/ ) * tt t  i f  t t t ff f =+− ≤ ≤ +
where tf is the infection time of case f.
The V0 parameter corresponds to the initial radius of
potential infection of an initial case. T is the period of
time during which the case could be regarded as
infectious.
By definition, our spatio-temporal filter is constructed
as follows. For a case to be ‘emerging’ it is necessary
and sufficient that there be no other cases in the spatio-
temporal truncated cones defined as (figure 2):
f is ‘emerging’ ⇔ no other case g different from f
and f Î D(g,V g(tf)),
where D( p ,V ) represents the disk of radius V and
center p.
We make the radius V grow in a linear way during the
period T from V0 at tf to 2*V0 at tf+ T:c o n s i d e r i n ga
cone and not a cylinder is an attempt to improve the
method by taking into account the local spreading dur-
ing the period T.
Applying this criterion to a set of space time point
events allow us to characterize the events in two sets:
emergent vs. non-emergent point events. Selecting only
Figure 1 Evolution of Avian Influenza cases number.H i s t o g r a mb yw e e kf r o mJ u l y ,1
st, 2004 until May, 1
st, 2008. Six successive waves are
highlighted (labeled) in the figure. The first wave (end 2003-May 2004) does not appear in the figure, as cases were recorded without enough
precision.
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events. The definition of emergence is restrictive: a real
emergent case (i.e., with no relationship to the previous
cases) can be considered as diffusion if it is surrounded
by a previous case; cases near a previous one, in space
and time, but not coming from a local diffusion process
are considered as diffusion by the filter. Therefore, find-
ing no clusters in ‘emergent’ cases does not mean that
real emergence does not show space-time clusters. But
analyzing the number and the spatial distribution of fil-
tered cases allows us to find characteristics of real emer-
gence. If only very few cases remain, we can conclude
that the disease occurs only from very limited introduc-
tions, or that all the introductions occur at the same
place and at the same time. If many cases remain, and if
they are clustered, we have strong evidence that envir-
onmental factors correlate with the emergence. If many
cases remain but are randomly distributed, the spatial
distribution cannot help us find environmental factors;
the causes of introduction may be linked to geographi-
cally random events, like anthropogenic factors.
Finding ‘emergent’ cases is a different problem from
finding spatial or spatiotemporal clusters. An ‘emergent’
case that doesn’t disseminate will be alone, with no
cluster of cases derived from it, but an ‘emergent’ case
that disseminates may show a posterior cluster of cases
(following a contagious spatial distribution). The well-
established techniques for identifying space time clusters
of disease (e.g., Kulldorff’s space-time scan statistics)
cannot be used in emergence detection [22].
The choice of T (days) and V0 (radius) depends on the
knowledge of biological processes and anthropogenic
factors related to avian influenza (time of contagious-
ness, virus persistence in the environment, virus trans-
portation, and agricultural and commercial practices).
While these parameters are poorly documented or sub-
ject to high variability [23,24], we chose to study various
combinations of V0 (10 to 800 km) and T (7, 14, 21, 28
days). Multi-testing was not an issue here, since we
didn’t try to find a global statistic to reject a null
hypothesis.
The 21-day period following an outbreak was used for
active surveillance by veterinary services in Thailand
and inferred from the characteristics of the virus and
the shedding of it from an infected bird. The distance
appeared more subjective. When an outbreak was
detected, an active surveillance involved an area within a
radius of 5 km. The agricultural practices and
Figure 2 Definition of space-time emergence. A case is taken as ‘emergent’ if no other cases appear in the truncated cone defined by an “R“
radius and a Δt height (elapsed time).
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are largely unknown and subject to high variability.
The cases were located by the center of the village in
which they belonged. The date of reporting by the DLD
was potentially the date of the first clinical case at the
farm and is considered in the spatiotemporal analysis.
The GIS we used (SavGIS, http://www.savgis.org)
allowed the selection of objects characterized with the
above defined emergence criteria, and provided tools for
identifying index cases (figure 3, figure 4). These space-
time analysis tools were developed in the framework of
this research project.
2.4. Geostatistical tests
Geostatistical tests were used to identify and to measure
the global difference between the observed geographical
distribution and a random distribution. The H0 hypoth-
esis is always: “The spatial distribution of points was
indistinguishable from a random spatial distribution” and
the H1 alternative hypothesis is “the spatial distribution
of points is not random”. The tests, Monte Carlo type,
are based on computer simulation of means or frequency
of geometric indices based on the neighborhood or dis-
tance. To test whether the spatial distribution of a sub-
set of points in a set of points is significantly different
from random, classically, two geometric characters are
used: the absolute position and the relative position of
dispersion. The absolute position of a sub-set of F from a
set of G can be characterized by Pf, the average point
(mean average of x and y) of the points F. This position
is compared with the average points Pi of subsets of
points (with the same number of points as F) randomly
selected from all points G,a sf o l l o w s :t h e s ePi means
points form another cloud of points, from which we cal-
culate the average point P0. Then we compare the dis-
tance Df, 0, between the point Pf and the average point
P0 of all simulated subsets, with the distribution of dis-
tances Di,0, between points Pi and point P0,w h i c hh a v e
an asymptotic normal distribution, and which allow test-
ing of hypotheses H0 and H1.
The dispersion of a sub-set F of points from a set G
of points can be characterized by two indices: the aver-
age of the minimum distance between nearest neighbors
in the subset F, and the percentage of points in the sub-
Figure 3 Perspective view of HPAI cases in Thailand (28 days, 100 km). Vertical axis represents the time. Recorded cases are plotted in blue,
and projected in green on the (longitude, time) plan, and in yellow on the (latitude, time) plan. ‘Emergent’ cases are plotted in red, and
projected in dark green on the (longitude, time) plan and in purple in the (latitude, time) plan.
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set F, the neighbors being taken from the set of points
G. This test consists of a comparison of these two
indices, calculated for the studied sub-set, with the dis-
tribution of the same indices obtained from subsets ran-
domly selected by lottery (Monte-Carlo simulation). The
MC simulation allows geostatistical tests to resolve the
influence of location of points and side effects inherent
to the spatial tests [19].
The list and location of all farms in Thailand is
unknown, and therefore we could not perform geosta-
tistical tests directly with reported infected farms. We
performed a scale transfer from farms to villages or
sub-districts, as we had villages or sub-district lists and
locations for the whole of Thailand. In the scale trans-
fer, we defined the infection as: an infected object (vil-
lage or sub-district) is an object with a positive
number of infected farms belonging to the object; an
emergent object is an object with a positive number of
emergent farms. With villages for example, we used
several sets of data points: the initial set of all villages
in Thailand (G); the subset of infected villages (I); and
the subset of villages considered as emerging (E). The
same calculation and characterization can be per-
formed with sub-districts. This calculation can be per-
formed directly in SavGIS using integration by
geographical aggregation.
We applied the geostatistical tests to I among G,a n d
E among G. All geostatistical tests were performed
using SavGIS software.
2.5. Environmental and land cover exposure statistical
tests
In order to determine the possible causes of emergence
(independent introduction or long distance jumps from
a previous case), we tried to find relations between
emergence and environmental characteristics–mainly
related to the presence of wild birds–at the village level.
For land use exposure factors, we used data derived
from remote sensing (Landsat-5, 30 m resolution, 2003),
processed by the Land Development Department (LDD,
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, Thailand).
Different classes were combined to study a few major
categories: wetlands; wetlands and rice fields; streams;
irrigated areas; broadcasted paddy fields; transplanted
paddy fields; urban areas; forests; and grasslands. With
SavGIS software, we calculated for each village the sur-
face percentage of each category in a 1 km radius
around the village center; we made the assumption that
the influence of environmental factors does not exceed
this distance (median minimum distance between two
villages centers is 0.8 km). We tested if the two groups
of villages (emergent vs. non-emergent) were signifi-
cantly different for each environmental category.
Due to the multiplicity of studied factors and the
multi-testing problem, the risk a taken into account for
each individual test is 0.5% (Bonferroni correction), and
the global risk a for rejecting the null hypothesis (H0:
emergent and non-emergent villages have no environ-
mental difference) remains at 5%. We used a non-para-
metric test by Monte-Carlo simulations (4000), available
in SavGIS software, to calculate variability and p-value
for each category. We also checked the relations with
agricultural and demographic data available at the sub-
district level (human population density; farm density;
chicken farm density; and duck farm density), using data
integration of cases in sub-districts by the geo-aggrega-
tion process in SavGIS, as already described in 2.4. We
used 2003 National Statistics Office census data avail-
able at the sub-district level (NSO, Ministry of Interior,
Thailand). We also tested differences between emergent
and non-emergent cases at the farm level using the farm
characteristics reported in the DLD data (poultry type).
3. Results
Starting from the last trimester of 2003, several epizoo-
tic waves can be observed (figure 1). The outbreak
reports of the first wave (January 2004 - April 2004)
were incomplete, so our study started with the second
wave (July 2004). Between July 3, 2004 and February 1,
2008, 10,319 suspected cases were reported and 1,755
have been confirmed as positive by laboratory tests. In
2007 and 2008, the suspected cases report is still active,
but less than 10 reported cases have been confirmed.
3.1. Outbreak Mapping
Mapping at the village scale for the whole of Thailand
would be difficult to read, due to the small number of
cases (1,755) and the high number of villages (72,335).
Therefore we performed mapping at the sub-district
level after scale transfer from farm to sub-district. Map-
ping of infected sub-districts was done by category of
infected birds, by type of farms, and by week (see maps
on website: http://www.rsgis.ait.ac.th/~souris/HPAI). We
also created maps using the available data on poultry
farms in Thailand (NSO and DLD data - 2003). Visually,
the overall distribution of all positive cases appeared not
to be random in space and cases were clustered, but
clusters depended on the type of bird (ducks, chicken,
etc.); they also did not correspond to the spatial distri-
bution of the farms. However, a strong visual correspon-
dence between the spatial distribution of the cases and
the density of different poultry species (especially free-
range ducks) has been previously reported and statisti-
cally analyzed [12,13,25-27]. There is also a strong visual
correspondence between the overall distribution of the
positive cases and the distribution of farms raising layer
ducks. Global geo-statistical tests confirmed that the
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distributed (risk a = 0.1%), and that, as expected for a
contagious disease, this spatial distribution is clustered.
3.2. Emergence
During each wave of epizootics, the temporal occur-
rence of cases did not show a temporal interruption of
more than a week. More than 90% of the cases had a
previous case within a 10 km range and a 21 day period
of time. Applying the spatiotemporal filter eliminated
most of the cases. Table 1 indicates the number of cases
which can be considered as ‘emerging’ with relevance of
T and V0. From a distance of 30 km and a period of
time of 21 days, spatial distribution of ‘emergent’ cases
do not show specific location, clusters, or trends; no
specific geographical pattern can be highlighted (e.g.:
migration corridors, wetlands, paddy fields). The
selected ‘emergent’ cases are present over the entire ter-
ritory of Thailand: no major region can be excluded
from the ‘emergence’ process (figure 3, figure 4). Three
locations within the central plain and close to the bor-
ders demonstrate repeated cases of emergence/reemer-
gence. Geo-statistical tests show when spatial
distribution of ‘emergence’ cannot be differentiated from
random distribution (Table 2).
3.3. Environmental and anthropogenic exposure factors
The statistical results of tests conducted on environmen-
tal exposure (’emergent villages’ compared to ‘other vil-
lages’)s h o wt h a ti fw ek e e pt h er i s ka at 0.5% for each
factor, no environmental factor or land cover characteris-
tic is statistically associated with emergence (for a risk a
Figure 4 Maps of HPAI emergence in Thailand. “Non emergent” cases are plotted in blue.
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paddy field area are significantly different - p = 0.02).
On the other hand, poultry type (from DLD classifica-
tion) is significantly different between emergent and
non-emergent farms (Table 3): egg chicken farms and
chicken farms are more related to emergence (11% vs.
4.5% and 9.5% vs. 4.9%), but duck farms, especially egg
duck farms, less so (4.7% vs. 15%). If we exclude from
emergence possible long-distance (less than 300 km) dif-
fusion jumps (V0 = 300 km, T =2 1d a y s ,T a b l e4 ) ,w e
find that francolin farms (quails) are at high risk for
emergence (p-value = 0.02%).
4. Discussion and conclusion
4.1. Limitations
Our definition of emergence is sensitive to the omission
of a positive case declaration, but as mentioned above
and in previous studies (§2.1), the case report from July
2004 is robust and Thailand is recognized to have a
good veterinarian surveillance system [12]. Our defini-
tion is also largely conservative; i.e., some cases may
have been discarded, though they could have been asso-
ciated with previous emergence. As noted, the choice of
V0 and T depends on biological or anthropogenic para-
meters which are poorly known (e.g., virus persistency
and a variety of agricultural and commercial practices).
Due to these limitations, this study must be interpreted
as an attempt to model emergence rather than fully
reflect the reality of the epidemics, which will never
been known.
4.2. Analysis
Several studies have shown that migratory birds are able
to exchange influenza A viruses and transport them
over long distances [28-33]. The role of migration
among certain species of the family Anatidae in spread-
ing the H5N1 subtype already has been suggested, but it
appears from the study of this literature that no cer-
tainty can be advanced about the long-distance spread
of the virus by migration [34-36]. Agro-commercial
activities have been identified as major factors of local
dispersion of the virus. Backyard poultry, which are
extensively present everywhere in Thailand and beyond
most measures of bio-security, can promote the mainte-
nance and local spread of the disease. Free grazing
ducks have been identified as an important risk factor in
the spread of the virus from wild to domestic birds and
between farms [12]. Poultry market activities (including
poultry staying overnight in the markets or unsold poul-
try returned the farm) have been highlighted as a main
cause of amplification and spread in some countries
[27,37], but this is not a concern in Thailand, as the
country has only few live-bird markets.
All these epidemiological risk factors involve short dis-
tances in the dissemination process (a few tens of kilo-
meters). In our geo-statistical analysis, a general trend
clearly separates the two situations, H0 and H1,a sa
function of V0 and T (Table 2). This trend and partition
into two groups can be interpreted as supporting the
existence of a limit to dissemination by proximity, and
w h i c ha l l o w su st oe s t i m a t e6 0k ma st h em a x i m u m
Table 1 Number of cases selected as emergent, as a function of radius distance (V) and elapsed past time without
cases (T).
TV
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 150 200 300 400 500
7 687 389 256 185 142 115 87 75 61 55 35 28 18 13 11
14 555 318 195 133 102 78 62 54 48 41 27 21 12 8 5
21 489 291 176 118 89 72 54 46 40 34 22 16 15 7 4
28 446 262 152 100 77 60 48 39 36 32 22 16 11 5 4
60 525 237 131 86 67 52 42 36 31 27 16 15 8 7 4
90 504 236 129 84 68 52 42 33 31 27 16 14 8 7 4
Parameters values are expressed as: T = time by days and V = distance in kilometers.
Table 2 Geo-statistical test for randomness, using the minimum distance between neighbor cases of same value (risk
a = 0.1%).
TV
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 150 200 300 400 500
7 H 1H 1H 1H 1H 1H 0H 0H 0H 0H 0 H 0 H 0 H 0 H 0 H 0
14 H1 H1 H1 H1 H0 H0 H0 H0 H0 H0 H0 H0 H0 H0 H0
21 H1 H1 H1 H0 H0 H0 H0 H0 H0 H0 H0 H0 H0 H0 H0
28 H1 H1 H1 H0 H0 H0 H0 H0 H0 H0 H0 H0 H0 H0 H0
Parameter values are as in Table 1 (T and V); H0 = null hypothesis (cannot be differentiated from a random pattern); H1 = alternative hypothesis (non random
pattern).
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parameters (21 days, 60 km), most of the cases have
been eliminated by our spatiotemporal filter, while 72
cases remain highlighted as ‘emergent’. These cases have
three possible origins: new introductions from external
sources (i.e., cases in other countries; migratory birds);
environmental emergence or re-emergence by local
virus persistence (in soil, in water [24], or in a possible
still unknown animal reservoir); long distance jumps
from previous cases by agro-commercial practices or
wild (resident or migratory) bird movements. Increasing
the radius of exclusion in the spatiotemporal filter
allows us to discard the possible long distances jumps.
From 300 km for V0 (radius of exclusion), a limited
number of cases (5 to 11) are considered as emergent,
disregarding the chosen time of exclusion; thus with
these hypotheses, it is likely that the epidemics of each
identified wave came from a very limited number of ori-
ginal sources. The geographical location of these cases
does not show any clustering; and we observed repeated
cases at the borders which reinforce the hypothesis of
human introduction by cross-border trade of poultry.
This result brought us, therefore, to investigate direct
causes of infection in the cases that fall between these two
dissemination situations (60 km/300 km)–which represent
about 60 cases (among a total of 1,755 cases)–and to focus
our attention on anthropogenic (agro-commercial prac-
tices) or environmental (wild birds, persistence) factors for
these cases. Statistical results show they are significantly
(risk a = 1%) more related to chickens than other kinds of
livestock, and that environmental conditions (presence of
water, water as physical vector, farm density, constructed
areas, land use characteristics, and population density) are
not significantly different. It is then reasonable to conclude
that most of these 60 cases may be interpreted as diffusion
jumps and are probably related to low frequency human
practices that encourage the spread over these distances (i.
e., interprovincial rearing practices: the purchase of
Table 3 Exposure factor: type of poultry in emergent vs. non-emergent farms (V = 60 km, T = 21 days, 72 farms)
Type of poultry Emergent farms (%) Non-Emergent farms (%) p-value (%)
Batam Cock 1.6 0.5 ± 0.9 15 (H0)
Domestic Chicken 59.2 55.3 ± 6.2 24 (H0)
Domestic Duck 1.6 1.1 ± 1.3 36 (H0)
Egg Chicken 10.9 4.4 ± 2.5 0.5 (H1)
Egg Duck 4.7 15.6 ± 4.2 0.7 (H1)
Farm Chicken 9.4 4.9 ± 2.6 4.9 (H1)
Farm Duck 3.2 7.6 ± 3 8.1 (H0)
Farm Francolin 3.2 2.2 ± 1.8 30 (H0)
Fighting Cock 3.2 2.7 ± 2 42 (H0)
Free range duck 1.6 1.1 ± 1.5 47 (H0)
Goose 0 0.8 ± 1 23 (H0)
Mandarin Duck 1.6 2.5 ± 1.9 30 (H0)
Turkey 0 0.2 ± 0.6 34 (H0)
Table 4 Exposure factor: type of poultry in emergent vs. non-emergent farms (V = 300 km, T = 21 days, 12 farms).
Type of poultry Emergent farms (%) Non-Emergent farms (%) p-value (%)
Batam Cock 8 (1 farm) 0.5 ± 2 0.003 (H1)
Domestic Chicken 42 (4 farms) 55.3 ± 14 16 (H0)
Domestic Duck 0 1.1 ± 3 35 (H0)
Egg Chicken 16 (2 farms) 4.4 ± 6 2 (H1)
Egg Duck 8 (1 farm) 15.6 ± 10 25 (H0)
Farm Chicken 0 4.9 ± 6 20 (H0)
Farm Duck 0 7.6 ± 7 15 (H0)
Farm Francolin 16 (2 farms) 2.2 ± 4 0.02 (H1)
Fighting Cock 0 2.7 ± 5 27 (H0)
Free range duck 0 1.6 ± 4 32 (H0)
Goose 0 0.8 ± 2 38 (H0)
Mandarin Duck 8 (1 farm) 2.5 ± 4 10 (H0)
Turkey 0 0.2 ± 1 43 (H0)
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Page 9 of 11chickens and the sale of egg laying hens; and game prac-
tices, such as fighting cocks).
4.3. Conclusion
In conclusion, our findings suggest that only a few index
cases are responsible for each HPAI epidemic wave and
that no geographical locations or environmental condi-
tions can be highlighted in ther i s ko fi n t r o d u c t i o no f
HPAI. Control need therefore be focused on dissemina-
tion rather than on emergence, in order to avoid local
farm to farm transmission,m e d i u mo rl o n gd i s t a n c e
jumps caused by agro-commercial practices, and intro-
duction caused by cross-border trade of poultry.
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